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Abstract 
 
Debt-induced crises, including the subprime, are usually attributed exclusively to supply-side 
factors.  We  uncover  an  additional  factor  contributing  to  debt  culture,  namely  social 
influences emanating from the perceived average income of peers. Using unique information 
from a representative household survey of the Dutch population that circumvents the need to 
define the social circle, we consider collateralized, consumer, and informal loans. We find 
robust social effects on borrowing—especially among those who consider themselves poorer 
than their peers—and on indebtedness, suggesting a link to financial distress. We check the 
robustness  of  our  results  using  several  approaches  to  rule  out  spurious  associations  and 
handle correlated effects. 
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1.  Introduction 
The  recent  financial  crisis  has  demonstrated  the  potential  for  sizeable  household 
groups to borrow at levels that expose them to subsequent difficulties in debt servicing and a 
nontrivial risk of default. Many U.S. households, for example, had exposed themselves to 
excessive mortgage debt prior to the subprime crisis, and some ended up with negative equity 
following the reversal of the historical house price trends. Yet the existing literature and 
public discussion have paid almost exclusive attention to the supply-side factors that may 
have contributed to this tendency, such as lax standards in the banking sector, the transfer of 
risk, and the resulting lack of discipline in applying sound banking standards.
1 
Far less  attention has been devoted to understanding  the demand-side  factors that 
contribute to the spread of a debt culture. One such factor, specific to the subprime crisis, is 
borrowers’ subjective belief—based on the long historical experience of price increases—that 
U.S.  house  prices  could  not  fall.
2  Our paper, however,  focuses on  another  major  factor 
applicable to all types of debt: comparison with peers, especially among households who see 
themselves as having fewer resources than the average of their peers.  
Although the role of perceived relative standing has been explored in many contexts, 
including consumption behavior, less attention has been paid to how  “catching  up”  or 
“keeping  up”  with  peers  is  financed,  and  hardly  any  to  whether  perceptions  of  relative 
standing are important for debt behavior. Yet, if such social influences are at work, regulation 
and monitoring of financial institutions may need to be combined with household measures 
(e.g., financial education, proper advice, product sale restrictions, appropriate default options) 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Mian and Sufi (2009), who show a shift in credit supply to be a key factor in the expansion 
of subprime mortgages in the U.S., and Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2012), who find that the quality of such 
loans  deteriorated  for  six  consecutive  years  prior  to  the  crisis.  Christelis,  Georgarakos  and  Haliassos 
(forthcoming), using recently available data, show that shortly prior to the recent crisis, outstanding mortgages 
were substantially larger among older U.S. households than among their European counterparts with similar 
resources and characteristics.  
2 See, for instance, the contributions by Case (2012), Shiller (2012), and Smith (2012).  
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if the spread of a debt culture and the risks for future debt-induced financial crises are to be 
contained. 
The importance of relative standing in the social circle has long been recognized. For 
instance,  models  with  interdependent  preferences  have  been  applied  to  consumption 
(Duesenberry, 1949; Abel, 1990; Gali, 1994, Kuhn et al., 2011); asset pricing (Campbell and 
Cochrane, 1999); investing in assets (Duflo and Saez, 2002; Hong, Kubik and Stein, 2004; 
Kaustia and Knüpfer, 2012); supply of labor (Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998); work effort 
(Cohn et al., 2011); and short-run stabilization policy (Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000). To the 
best of our knowledge, however, this paper is the first to investigate the influence of social 
interactions and comparison effects on borrowing behavior. 
More specifically, our  paper exploits  unique features  of  the Dutch National  Bank 
Household  Survey  (DNBHS),  which  is  representative  of  the  entire  Dutch  population,  to 
uncover a statistically and economically significant influence of perceived relative standing 
on household behavior with respect to collateralized loans, consumer (uncollateralized) loans, 
and informal loans. We find that, once we control for demographics, resources, region and 
time  fixed  effects,  region-specific  time  trends,  and  other  factors  that  typically  determine 
borrowing needs, a higher average income in the social circle, as perceived by a household, 
increases this household’s tendency to borrow.
3 Not only is this influence stronger among 
those who perceive their income to be below average for their social  circle, it is  also not 
confined to borrowing: it extends to  the household’s financial debt burden. We check the 
robustness  of  these  results  using  several  approaches,  including  instrumental  variable 
estimation and placebo tests. Our aim is to rule out uninteresting alternative explanations of 
the peer income-own borrowing relation and address the potential for spurious correlation 
between the two because of similarity in unobserved characteristics with those of peers.  
                                                 
3 The estimated effects are sizeable for both collateralized and consumer debt: a 1,000 euro increase in the 
perceived monthly average household income of peers is estimated to raise the unconditional likelihood of 
having collateralized (uncollateralized) loans by 10% (7%).    
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  Nonetheless,  uncovering  the effects  of  social  interactions  on borrowing  behavior 
does pose special challenges not necessarily present in other domains. First, wealth surveys, 
being subject to a high degree of anonymization, do not typically provide information on 
social circle characteristics and tend to omit or heavily restrict information on location. Faced 
with  this  challenge,  social  interaction  research  on  the  asset  side  resorts  to  constructing 
hypothesized social circles based on sorting assumptions (e.g., age and education), focusing 
on specific products and groups with visible interactions (e.g., retirement plans in particular 
establishments),  or  considering  the  frequency  of  meetings.  We,  however,  are  able  to 
overcome this limitation because of the unique nature of the DNBHS, which asks respondents 
to describe key features of their social circle (e.g., age, education, occupation), including the 
perceived average income of peers. It also reports the entire range of household assets and 
debts. An additional challenge is that, although households may derive some  status from 
revealing their wages, consumption, or asset levels to their social circle (or may be unable to 
hide them), they tend to be quite averse to revealing debt levels, a reticence protected by bank 
confidentiality. Thus, the important channel through which peer effects are likely to operate 
is not the direct observation and emulation of borrowing behavior among peers but rather the 
observation of some key determinant of this behavior (e.g., resources or ability to spend).  
 It should nevertheless be stressed that the research question of social influences on 
debt is quite distinct from that relating to consumption: even if concern with relative standing 
leads to greater consumption, it may not lead to a greater tendency to borrow or to run into 
financial  distress  for  at  least  three  reasons.  First,  households  can  increase  labor  supply 
together with consumption, leaving room for an increase in both consumption and saving. For 
example, Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) find that married women in the U.S. are 16 to 25% 
more likely to work outside the home if their sisters’ husbands earn more than their own. It 
should be noted that even a positive labor supply response can imply either more or less  
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saving/borrowing.
4 Second, households may choose to reduce saving but may not be willing 
or able to  raise  borrowing  in response to status concerns . Third, even if borrow ing is 
undertaken to keep up with peers, it does not necessarily lead to financial distress.  
Our paper  complements three different strands of literature: the effects of social 
interactions on asset choices, the relative income hypothesis and external habits, and “envy 
versus ambition.” To address the first, Duflo and Saez (2002) study the saving behavior of 
employees  in  different  libraries  at  a  large  American  university  and  demonstrate  that 
individual  participation  in  retirement  investment  plans  is  influenced  by  colleagues’ 
participation choices.
5 Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004), on the other hand, focus on sociability, 
showing that more sociable individuals (in terms of frequent communication with neighbors 
and church-going) are more likely to own stocks.
6  
As regards the  second, the  importance of peer income  for consumption  was  first 
stressed  in  the  (cross-sectional)  formulation  of  Duesenberry’s  (1949)  relative  income 
hypothesis,  built  on  insights  from  Veblen  (1899)  and  Smith  (1759).  According  to  this 
hypothesis,  households  whose  incomes  are  below  average  in  their  social  circle  tend  to 
consume  a  larger  share  of  their  income  to  keep  up  with  peers.  Modern  analyses  of 
consumption and asset pricing, however, make a fine distinction between “keeping up” and 
“catching up” with the Joneses.
7 Recent work by Kuhn et al. (2011) examines the effects on 
consumption of winning a Dutch postal code lottery. Using specially collected survey data on 
                                                 
4 Most existing theoretical models, which are based on an infinite-horizon representative agent, imply greater 
consumption, less leisure, and greater accumulation of assets in order to keep up with the Joneses both now and 
in the future (Liu and Turnovsky, 2005). When Alvarez-Cuadrado and Van Long (2008) consider overlapping 
generations in an infinite-horizon economy, however, they find less leisure but also lower saving. 
5 Such endogenous social effects could come from learning about assets or from discovering relevant social 
norms, but it is difficult to distinguish the two. 
6 Brown et al. (2008) identify a causal influence of sociability on stockholding by instrumenting the average  
stock ownership of an individual’s community with past average ownership of the U.S. states in which the 
individual’s  nonnative  neighbors  were  born.  Georgarakos  and  Pasini  (2011)  document  similar  effects  of 
sociability on stockholding in Europe. 
7  In a more  recent model developed by Roussanov (2010), which focuses particularly on private business 
ownership, utility is a function of relative wealth and households are characterized by a desire to “get ahead of 
the Joneses”.    
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expenditures  and  different  assumptions  about  the  social  circle,  the  authors  find  that 
exogenous  variations  in  income  from  winning  the  lottery  tend  to  influence  not  only  the 
durables purchased by winners but also the probability that neighbors will buy a new car.
8  
Whereas the level of consumption may be influenced by relative income,  however, 
the composition of consumption may signal  an individual’s income relative to others. The 
literature on conspicuous consumption (see Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov, 2009, and the 
references therein), for example, stresses utility from status, defined as others’ perceptions of 
one’s own income. Since income is not directly observable, perceptions are based on the 
person’s group (e.g., a racial group in a particular state) and on observed (“conspicuous”) 
consumption. This desire to signal status can explain why minority races in the U.S. tend to 
spend larger fractions of their budgets on conspicuous consumption  than do Whites with 
similar  permanent  income.
9  Such outlay  is financed through lower minority spending on 
other items (particularly, health and education) and through savings ,  although  the extant 
research  does not  investigate  borrowing.  A  link between conspicuous consumption and 
borrowing is addressed, however, in the theoretical model of status developed by Rayo and 
Becker (2006), who argue that, in order to signal status to more people over a longer period 
of time, conspicuous consumption goods tend to be durables, which often require borrowing 
finance. 
The third strand of literature addresses relative income and self-reported happiness or 
general well-being. Although a number of these studies demonstrate a negative influence of 
others’ income on subjective well-being,
10 Hirschmann and Rothschild (1973) stress  utility-
                                                 
8 Their survey, however, collected no information on debts or on participants’ perceptions of their peers. 
9 Conspicuous consumption rises with an individual’s own income and falls with the average level of income of 
that person’s group. Hence, for signaling purposes, although the poorest person in the group need not spend 
more on conspicuous consumption, all others need to do so. 
10 For example, Clark and Oswald (1996) show that worker s’ job satisfaction is negatively influenced by the 
income earned by other individuals in their reference group. Likewise, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), using German 
panel data, finds that the larger an individual’s income compared to acquaintances, the better off that individual 
tends to be.   
 
6 
enhancing “anticipatory feelings” (Caplin and Leahy, 2001), which they term the “tunnel 
effect.” This effect is analogous to an individual caught in a traffic jam in a tunnel who, on 
seeing another lane moving, anticipates that the own line will also move soon.
11  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the unique features 
of our data set.  Section 3 discusses possible channels through which peers  might influence 
borrowing behavior and the econometric approach taken to address a number of challenges. 
Section 4 presents the main results on the relation between peers’ perceived income and debt 
behavior, including  those from  endogeneity tests  and  IV estimates. Section  5 reports the 
results of the placebo tests and additional robustness checks. Section 6 provides evidence of 
asymmetric effects on borrowing across households poorer and richer than the peer average 
and inspects likely channels through which peer income operates. Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2.  The Data 
The DNBHS, launched in 1993, provides a unique data set that includes information 
on work, pensions, housing, mortgages, income, assets, consumer loans, health, economic 
and psychological concepts, as well as personal characteristics. It thus allows the study of 
both the psychological and economic aspects of financial behavior. The initial survey was 
administered to around 2,790 Dutch households oversampled from the top 10% of the income 
distribution and weighted to be representative of the Dutch-speaking population. Since then, 
households  have  been  re-interviewed  annually,  with  new  households  added  each  year  to 
counteract  the non-negligible  attrition  and  keep the  cross-sectional sample representative. 
Because the survey underwent a major refreshing in 2001, resulting in a sample of 1,861 
                                                 
11 Senik (2004) finds empirical support for the “tunnel effect” using survey data from Russia and in later work, 
documents a negative comparison income effect in many “old” European countries and a positive one (i.e., 
consistent with a “tunnel effect”) in East European countries and the U.S., linked mainly to the degree of income 
mobility (Senik, 2008).  
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households, we pool data from the 2001 to 2008 waves, which cover a period of relatively 
stable employment rates and increasing housing prices.
12 We also employ survey weights to 
account  for  the  overrepresentation  of  the  wealthy.  After  excluding  households  with 
incomplete questionnaires or missing information on social circle characteristics, the pooled 
sample used in the baseline estimations consists of roughly 4,500 households.  
This survey not only  includes an extensive questionnaire  on  income and real and 
financial wealth holdings, it also asks specific debt-related questions. These responses allow 
us to distinguish between collateralized and uncollateralized debt, as well as informal loans 
from friends and relatives.  Hence, in the following discussion, although we focus primarily 
on consumer debt and collateralized debt, we also report results for informal loans.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the prevalence and the amounts outstanding 
among debt holders by survey year and by loan type. These figures suggest a relatively stable 
prevalence of all three types of loan over the years  studied. Collateralized debts account for 
most household borrowing, being held by roughly 40% of the households, with a median 
conditional outstanding amount of about 98,000 euro. One out of five Dutch households has 
consumer loans with a median outstanding amount of roughly 4,000 euro.
13 On the other 
hand, only 4% of households report loans from friends and relatives, although almost 28% 
report that they can borrow from friends in the future.  
In the absence of information on  respondents’ perceptions  of peers, the empirical 
network  literature  typically  constructs  hypothesized  social  circles  based  on  sorting 
assumptions (e.g., age-education cells or geographic proximity). One unique feature of the 
Dutch survey, most relevant for our purposes here, is that individuals are asked to explicitly 
                                                 
12 Unemployment rates in the Netherlands reached a minimum of 3% in 2008 but increased to 3.7 and 4.5% in 
2009 and 2010, respectively. National housing prices increased on average by roughly 2% each year up to 2008, 
after which they declined by 2.8% in 2009 and by 3.4% in 2010. 
13 Extended lines of credit (unrelated to home equity) account for roughly 40% of the average outstanding 
volume of consumer loans, followed by almost 20% from checking account overdrafts. Student loans ac count 
for 17% and private loans for 12%, while only 6% relate to outstanding credit card debts.  
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report a number of characteristics of those with whom they “associate frequently, such as 
friends, neighbors, acquaintances, or maybe people at work.” This subjective information can 
be particularly helpful for understanding who interacts with whom and circumvents the key 
issue of defining the social circle. Indeed, Soetevent (2006) stresses the potential of such 
information for social interaction models, while Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) exploit such 
subjective information (on peer age and education) from the DNBHS to assess peer effects on 
female labor supply.  
DNBHS  respondents  also  report  their  perceptions  of  the  average  annual  total  net 
household income among people in their social circle, recorded in one of eleven income 
brackets (see the appendix). Other questions cover the age category of most members of their 
social circle, as well as the average household size, average education, most prevalent type of 
employment, and average hours of work per week of their peers distinguished by gender. The 
survey also asks directly about respondents’ interactions with peers in relation to exchanging 
financial  information  or  informal  borrowing,  perceptions  of  the  social  circle’s  spending 
ability,  and  expectations  for  their  own  future  income.  We  use  this  information  in  the 
empirical analysis to shed light on the process through which social interactions influence 
borrowing behavior.  
 
3.  Effects of the Social Circle on Debt Behavior 
3.1  Possible Channels 
The asset market participation and holdings of peers may influence any member of the 
peer  group  via  direct  observation  of  financial  behavior,  information  sharing,  and 
dissemination of social norms. Peer effects in borrowing behavior, however, are much less 
likely to emanate from direct observation of peers’ loans or even from discussions with them 
about their indebtedness. That is, loans, unlike assets, are not directly observable by third  
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parties and can only become known if borrowers decide to reveal them, but borrowers are 
less  likely  to  discuss  their  loans  than  exhibit  their  assets  because  of  embarrassment  or 
shame.
14 Nonetheless, financial advice and consultation with members of the social circle 
may inform households about the process of obtaining formal or informal loans and/or about 
the social norms of borrowing; it may even lead to informal loans from the social circle. We 
can explicitly take this possible channel of effects into account because our data allow us to 
identify households that consult family, friends, and acquaintances about financial decisions 
and that can borrow from their social circle in the future.  
Even households that do not consult their social circle may still be influenced by  that 
circle’s observable behavior when deciding whether to take out a loan and how much to 
borrow. Households form perceptions of acquaintances’ average disposable income based on 
social interaction sources that range from direct knowledge of acquaintances’ pay scales to 
open discussions  with  friends  and  family, and  inference of income levels  from  observed 
spending or asset accumulation patterns.
15 Because the DNBHS asks respondents directly 
about the perceived average income of their acquaintances ,  we can  directly  assess  these 
perceptions’ influence on their borrowing behavior. In doing so, we assume that perceptions 
of  higher  peer  income  may  contribute  positively  to  borrowing  through  three  possible 
channels: trying to emulate the spending or living standards of acquaintances (a comparison 
effect), inferring that more can be borrowed directly from them in the future, and inferring 
that one’s own future income is likely to move in the same direction as that of one’s social 
circle (an expectation or “tunnel” effect).  
                                                 
14 Such considerations have been shown to be important even in countries with underdeveloped credit markets, 
where informal borrowing is quite widespread. For example, Collins et al. (2009), using data from Bangladesh, 
India, and South Africa, find that many indebted households feel ashamed to ask relatives for additional credit 
or do not wish to reveal their financial situation to close acquaintances. 
15 Indeed, imputation of incomes on the basis of spending items or asset accumulation is sometimes used by tax 
authorities to fight tax evasion in countries in which these phenomena are widespread.  
 
10 
With  reference  to  the  first  channel,  spending  behavior  or  visible  accumulation  of 
assets (like housing) by members of the social circle may well induce a household to borrow 
in order to match (or exceed) it. Our data allow us to observe respondents’ perceptions of 
peers’ spending ability and to take them into account in our estimation. Since we do not 
observe respondents’ perceptions of peers’ housing or living standards, we impute them from 
the data reported by households that could belong to the same peer group, as they share some 
key  characteristics.  The  data  do  allow  us  to  directly  address  the  second  channel,  using 
household responses on whether they are in a position to borrow a significant amount of 
money from friends and relatives. As regards the third channel, we first use households’ 
reported expectations for their own future income and then examine robustness of our results 
using respondent’s permanent income rather than expected future income.  
 
3.2  Econometric Specification 
 In the benchmark specification, we examine whether households’ tendency to borrow 
and the size of the loans conditional on borrowing are influenced by the average income they 
perceive their peer group to have. We derive the latter from responses to the following survey 
question: “If you think of your circle of acquaintances, how much do you think is the average 
total  net  income  per  year  of  those  households?”  The  possible  answers  are  presented  in 
brackets. In our reported results, we use the midpoints of these bands, adjusted for inflation, 
while  in  the  appendix,  we  detail  a  number  of  robustness  checks  that  employ  different 
specifications of this variable.
16 
The extant literature on social interactions in consumption or asset holding s focuses 
on uncovering what Manski (1993) terms “endogenous social effects”; namely, the direct 
effects of observing others’ behavior (e.g., consumption or asset holdings) on one’s own 
                                                 
16 We experiment, for example, with using dummy variables for income bands and a flag dummy for “don’t 
know” responses, but the results are insensitive to these variations.  
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actions.
17  Econometric  modeling  in  this  context  must  address  the  reflection  problem 
generated when the behavior of households in a group is expressed as a function of the 
average behavior of the group that includes them. Given that debts, as discussed earlier, are 
typically unobservable by other social circle members, our primary focus is on uncovering 
exogenous or contextual effects ; that is,  influences on debt behavior that emanate from 
observing (or forming perceptions of) not debts but key peer characteristics relevant for debt 
behavior (e.g., income).  
In this setting, the two major challenges are to rule out (i) spurious links between peer 
income and the respondent’s own borrowing behavior that have little to do with a comparison 
effect and (ii) correlated effects, an association between these two variables stemming from 
similarities in the unobserved characteristics of the respondent or respondent’s environment 
and those of peers.  
In our regressions, we control separately for the net income of peers and the effects of 
household resources in the form of net income, net financial wealth, and net real wealth.
18 We 
also take into account the respondent’s age (through a second-order polynomial), gender, and 
educational attainment, as well as marital status and number of children.  
One  standard,  albeit  uninteresting,  potential  source  of  an  effect  of  peers’  higher 
perceived  income  on  borrowing  relates  to  an  adverse  idiosyncratic  shock;  that  is,  once 
income is controlled for, the higher the perceived average income of peers, the greater the 
chance that the household has experienced a bad idiosyncratic shock during this period. In 
such  a  case,  standard  models  would  prescribe  more  borrowing  to  smooth  any  adverse 
transitory  shock.  We  control  for  this  possibility  by  including  in  our  specifications  self-
                                                 
17 For thorough reviews of methodological issues in social interaction models, see Soetevent (2006) and Durlauf 
and Ioannides (2010).  
18 We allow for nonlinear effects of household net income, financial and real wealth, and peers’ net income (all 
of  which  have  skewed  distributions)  by  means  of  an  inverse  hyperbolic  sine  (IHS)  transformation  (i.e., 
log(x+(x
2+1)
1/2). The advantage of this near-logarithmic transformation is that it is defined for zero and negative 
values  (see  also  Pence,  2006).  Our  results  are  robust  to  alternative  specifications  of  the  aforementioned 
covariates (e.g., dummies denoting quartiles).  
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reported  health,  labor  market  status  dummies,  and,  most  especially,  answers  to  a  direct 
question on whether last year’s income was ‘”unusually low.” In addition, as described in 
Section 5, we estimate models that control for a household permanent income proxy that is 
more resilient to temporary shocks. 
  Another possibility is that the respondent’s perception of higher income in the social 
circle partly reflects a macro or regional shock, so that perceptions could improve simply 
based on better performance in the macro-economy or the region in which most of the social 
circle is located. We take these two channels into account flexibly by including both year and 
province
19 fixed effects in all our specifications . To account for any region-specific time 
trends that may correlate with trends in both peer income and borrowing (e.g., more rapid 
housing price appreciation in certain regions), we condition our specifications on a full set of 
interaction terms between province and year fixed effects.
20   
A more complex potential channel for a positive association between peer income and 
borrowing is associated with correlated effects; that is, there may be unobserved factors that 
influence both the desire to borrow and the desire to associate with high -income peers and 
acquaintances. In the case of informal loans, this link could be very direct: respondents would 
be more likely to associate with high -income peers and relatives in order to borrow from 
them. In the case of formal loans, the link could be  more subtle. For any given need to 
borrow, higher income friends  could provide more informal loans, reducing the need for 
formal borrowing. However, unobserved factors could also make respondents more likely to 
borrow using any type of loan while simultaneously encouraging them to associate with peers 
                                                 
19 We are able to use disaggregated information about place of residence for twelve Dutch provinces; namely, 
Groningen,  Friesland,  Drenthe,  Overijssel,  Flevoland,  Gelderland,  Utrecht,  Noord-Holland,  Zuid-Holland, 
Zeeland, Noord-Brabant, and Limburg. 
20 When modeling collateralized borrowing, we also c onduct a series of robustness checks to examine the 
sensitivity of our results to inclusion of certain relevant regional indicators and to a specific functional form of 
time trends (i.e., instead of the general form adopted in the baseline regressions).  
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perceived as wealthy and in a position to provide informal loans. In this case, a spurious 
positive relation might be generated between peer income and all types of loans.  
We also consider the possibility of reverse causality: households may borrow with the 
specific aim of associating with people whom they perceive as earning more. We, however, 
consider this explanation less compelling a priori than the possibility that households borrow 
because they perceive their peers as having larger income. Nonetheless, there is still a distinct 
possibility that it is because households borrow that they come to think of their peers as 
having more income. It is worthwhile, therefore, to consider both possibilities: correlated 
effects and reverse causality.  
One possible approach to addressing the former would be to allow for peer group 
fixed effects; however, as this method cannot also handle potential reverse causality, it is not 
the most suitable choice for our data. Moreover, its application would require that the peer 
groups  be  either  known  or  assumed  and  that  the  (observable)  variation  within  them  be 
sufficient to identify the causal relation of interest.
21 A key advantage of our data is that they 
allow us to avoid making arbitrary assumptions about the identity of peers  or respondent 
perceptions  of  peers ,  as  they  ask   respondents  directly  about  their  perceptions  of  peer 
characteristics. However, our data record perceptions regarding average characteristics of 
peers and record only average characteristics—not variation between peers. Thus, applying 
this  method  would  be  inconsistent  with  exploiting  the  strengths  of  our  data.  Rather,  we 
pursue two alternative ways to address identification in the presence of correlated effects: 
instrumental variable estimation, which also addresses concerns of possible reverse causality, 
and estimation of peer income’s influence using a series of placebo regressions.  
A valid instrumental variable must have two attributes: it should be correlated with 
the covariate of interest (i.e., perceived average income of the social circle), and its effects on 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Lundborg (2006) and Soetevent and Kooreman (2007) who use school grade (or class) fixed 
effects and exploit the variation within classmates in order to assess health behavior among adolescents in 
schools.  
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an individual’s own borrowing should run through peer income but not other unobserved 
factors. Our identification strategy exploits variations in local labor market conditions and the 
asymmetric  effects  that  these  can  have  for  the  incomes  of  households  with  different 
educational  backgrounds.  That  is,  a  given  difference  in  educational  attainment  between 
respondent and peers can imply a larger difference in (perceived) incomes in regions with 
better conditions for highly educated workers. We thus use as our instrument the interaction 
between regional employment rates in high-tech sectors and the difference in educational 
attainment between each respondent and the peers.  
At the same time, we control for the respondent’s own educational attainment and 
occupational status, for peers’ average level of educational attainment, for province and time 
fixed effects, and for the entire set of interactions between province and time fixed effects.
22 
The identification assumption is that the educational gap between respondent and peers will 
raise  the  respondent’s  perception  of  peers’  average  income,  and  even  more  so  when  the 
regional  employment  share  in  high  technology  occupations,  for  which  education  matters 
greatly, is  larger.
23  Indeed, results from the auxiliary regressions (presented in Appendix 
Table D.1) suggest a strong positive association between our instrument and the perceived 
income of peers. 
 
                                                 
22 Province fixed effects serve to absorb any regional disparities (e.g., due to development, unemployment, or 
bank diffusion) that are likely to have a direct influence on individual borrowing. Time fixed effects absorb any 
common time trend, while their interactions with provinces take into account any region-specific time trend. 
Peers’ average level of education takes into account the educational attainment of peers that can be relevant for 
finding jobs in the high-tech sector (i.e., college or post-secondary education). “High-tech sector” refer to both 
high-tech  manufacturing  industries  (the  manufacture  of  basic  pharmaceutical  products  and  pharmaceutical 
preparation computer, electronic, and optical products) and high-tech  knowledge-intensive services (motion 
picture,  video  and  television  program  production,  sound  recording  and  music  publishing  activities; 
programming and broadcasting activities; telecommunications; computer programming; consultancy and related 
activities; information service activities; scientific research and development). 
23 Virtually all heads of households in the sample have completed full time education and were not attending 
any (full or part time) education program at the time of interview. Hence, it is quite unlikely that relatively less - 
educated individuals living in regions with a high fraction of high -tech sector jobs would decide to borrow in 
order to invest in their human capital and thereby improve their career prospects.  
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4.  Results for the Role of Peer Income in Borrowing Behavior 
To model the likelihood of having loans and the (log) amount of loans outstanding, 
we estimate a series of probit and tobit models, respectively. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity,  allowing for clustering at  the household  level.  To show the economic 
significance of our findings, we report average marginal effects for the probit models, and 
average marginal effects conditional on having the loan type under study for the tobit models. 
In this section, we report the results for our baseline specification and IV tests for the three 
different loan types considered: informal loans, collateralized formal loans, and consumer 
(uncollateralized) formal loans.  
Table 2 reports  the  results  for loans from  the  social  circle, including  the  average 
marginal  effects  from  a  probit  regression  modeling  the  probability  that  the  respondent 
believes he or she can borrow from friends or relatives in the future if needed (col. 1). The 
estimated marginal effect of the perceived average income of the social circle is positive and 
significant at 1%. This figure implies that an assumed increase of the (perceived) annual 
household income of peers by 12,000 euro (i.e., 1,000 on a monthly basis) is associated with 
a 2.2 percentage point (pp) higher probability that the respondent reported a future likelihood 
of borrowing from the social circle. Our instrument is highly significant at 1% in the relevant 
auxiliary regression, with an F-test well above the rule of thumb threshold of 10. We fail to 
reject exogeneity, but only marginally so (p-value: .14). The marginal effect estimated using 
the  IV probit model is statistically significant  and higher than the one derived under the 
simple  probit  model  (7.0  pp,  significant  at  5%).
24  Our estimation of  the probability that 
respondents currently have informal loans also shows a positive association with average peer 
                                                 
24 Given that the original model is nonlinear with one (potentially) endogenous covariate that is continuous, we 
use standard maximum likelihood routines that fit discrete choice models with one endogenous covariate (e.g., 
ivprobit in Stata). These produce the consistent estimated coefficients and associated standard errors necessary 
for the computation of marginal effects. An alternative way to test and correct for endogenous covariates in 
nonlinear regression models is the two-step procedure of Rivers and Vuong (1988), summarized in Wooldridge 
(2002, p. 473). Application of this procedure to all the models presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4 produces results 
that are entirely consistent with those reported above.  
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income on the order of .8 pp
25 (p-value .06), while we fail to reject the null of exogeneity by a 
wide margin (p-value: >.75). The results from the tobit regressions on outstanding informal 
loan amounts paint a similar picture. 
  Table 3 presents the results for collateralized formal loans, where we additionally 
control  for  intentions  to  borrow  from  friends  in  the  future  and  whether  the  respondent 
receives  financial  advice  from  friends  and  relatives.  We  find  no  significant  association 
between an individual’s borrowing behavior and these additional two covariates. If anything, 
the  results  suggest  a  negative  association  (significant  at  10%  in  the  tobit  specification) 
between receiving advice from friends and outstanding levels of collateralized debt. We also 
estimate the statistically significant effects of the perceived average household income of the 
social circle (based on an assumed 12,000 euro annual increase) both on the likelihood of 
having  a  collateralized  loan  and  on  the  (conditional)  outstanding  amount.  The  estimated 
marginal  effect  from  probit  is  4.2  pp,  implying  an  almost  10%  net  contribution  to  the 
unconditional likelihood of having a mortgage. The estimated effect from tobit suggests a 
conditional elasticity of 0.48, corresponding roughly to a 15,000 euro increase in the amount 
borrowed by a typical household with collateralized debt.
26 We again fail to reject the null of 
peer income exogeneity (see bottom of table), now with p-values ranging from .19 to .24. 
Instrumental probit and tobit models yield qualitatively similar marginal effects.
27 
Because our baseline specification allows for interactions between year and province 
fixed effects, it  is flexible enough to account for any region-specific time trends that may 
influence  individual  borrowing  decisions.  Nonetheless,  since  the  period  under  study  is 
marked by a dramatic appreciation in housing prices and an increase in the home ownership 
rates relevant for collateralized debt, we perform additional tests on the robustness of our 
                                                 
25 This figure corresponds to an almost 20% increase in the unconditional probability of borrowing from friends. 
26 This calculation is based on conditional medians of collateralized debt (98,000 euro) and of peers’ income 
(34,500 euro) among households with outstanding collateral loans. 
27 The estimated marginal effect ( p-value) from the instrumental variable probit model is 9.1 pp (.013); the 
corresponding estimated conditional elasticity from the instrumental variable tobit models is .95 (.025).  
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findings. Specifically, we estimate various specifications that control for year and province 
fixed effects, as well as for province-specific time trends of certain housing indicators. Table 
C.2  lists  the  specifications  with  province-specific  yearly  growth  rates  of  housing  prices, 
housing stock, and aggregate homeownership rates. We also estimate a specification with a 
quadratic time trend by province.  In all cases,  the results  from  both the  probit and tobit 
models are very similar to those derived under our baseline specification, which allows for 
any region-specific time trends by taking into account the interaction between province and 
time fixed effects.   
We then test the sensitivity of our findings to the difference between collateralized 
borrowing for house purchase and that for home equity extraction. Because our data do not 
allow for a direct distinction, we use the outstanding amount of the first mortgage on the 
main residence as a lower-bound estimate of the former. Our estimates of the marginal effects 
of peer income on the first mortgage on the main residence are very similar to those for total 
collateralized debt.
28   
  Table 4  reports the estimates relating to  (uncollateralized) formal consumer loans. 
Here, we estimate a positive marginal effect of peer income on the probability that consumer 
loans are on the order of 1.6 pp (i.e., contributing about 7% to the unconditional likelihood of 
having such loans). The corresponding elasticity of the size of consumer loans, conditional on 
borrowing,  to  peer  income  is  on  the  order  of  0.24,  which  implies  an  increase  of 
approximately  400  euro  in  the  amount  borrowed  by  a  typical  borrower .
29  Using  our 
instrument,  we  fail to reject  the  null of peer income  exogeneity in both probit and tobit 
models by a wide margin (i.e., p-values>.70). Interestingly, receiving financial advice from 
                                                 
28 The conditional median (mean) outstanding amount of the first mortgage on the main residence is 83,194 euro 
(102,921  euro)  with  an  average  prevalence  of  36%.  Hence,  this  first  mortgage  accounts  for  most  of  the 
collateralized borrowing over the period under study. The estimated marginal effect (p-value) from probit on 
peer income is 4.1 pp (p-value less than .001), while the corresponding estimated conditional elasticity from 
tobit is .49 (p-value less than .001). 
29 Based on the conditional medians of uncollateralized debt (4,000 euro) and of peers’ income (26,000 euro) 
among households with consumer loans.  
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the social circle is negatively related to obtaining a consumer loan and to borrowing larger 
amounts conditional on obtaining the loan. This suggests that financial advice from peers, 
rather  than  providing  information  on  how  to  obtain  a  formal  consumer  loan,  tends  to 
discourage respondents from doing so.   
 
5.  Placebo Tests and Additional Robustness Exercises 
To further investigate the issue of endogenous peer income by exploiting the richness 
of the data, we perform a series of placebo tests to guard against the possibility of unobserved 
factors that influence both income and the borrowing choices of those of similar age and 
education living in the same province. The underlying rationale is that if such factors were 
important, they would operate for any social circle sharing those characteristics and not only 
for the respondent’s specific social circle. To conduct the placebo test, we construct cells 
based  on  respondent  age,  education,  province  of  residence,  and  interview  year  and  then 
assign to each respondent in a given cell the acquaintances of another, randomly selected, 
respondent in that same cell.  
  The results from these placebo regressions for formal loans are summarized in Table 
5. Unlike the income of the respondents’ actual social circle, the randomly assigned income 
of acquaintances is insignificant across all specifications (with p-values well above .40 and 
estimated  magnitudes  that  are  economically  unimportant).  We  also  perform  additional 
placebo tests based on cells constructed using various combinations of the aforementioned 
traits and respondent gender. In no cases do we find any significant effects of the (randomly 
assigned)  incomes  of  acquaintances.  These  results  further  support  the  premise  that  the 
estimated effects of average peer income in our baseline specification reflect the effects of 
comparison to peers, rather than being an artifact of social group characteristics.  
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We next consider the possibility of unobserved factors that systematically influence 
both the propensity to borrow and the association with more affluent peers. If such factors 
exist, it would seem plausible that perceived peer income would have a stronger effect on 
borrowing among those who have received financial advice from friends and/ or who plan to 
borrow from them in the future, two attributes directly recorded in the DNBHS data. We 
therefore test for this possibility in formal loans by introducing into the baseline models 
interaction terms between peer income and two dummies representing these attributes. In all 
re-estimations, the two interaction terms are jointly insignificant. 
Our third approach to assessing the potential relevance of unobserved factors for peer 
income is to take into account the entire set of peer characteristics asked about in the survey. 
To do so, we re-estimate the baseline models for formal loans (see Tables 3 and 4) including 
as additional covariates the average age, education, household size, and employment status of 
the social circle. In all cases, the estimated effects on peer income in terms of magnitude, 
sign, and significance remained unchanged, while the additional social circle characteristics 
prove mostly statistically insignificant.  
Lastly, we check the sensitivity of our findings to an income measure that is less 
volatile to temporary idiosyncratic shocks and local time trends than the current household 
income used in our baseline specifications. We follow Kapteyn, Alessie, and Lusardi (2005), 
who apply a standard lifecycle permanent income hypothesis model to DNBHS data,
30 and 
we  estimate  a  measure  of   permanent  income  for  each  household  that  represents  the 
discounted present value of its future lifetime resources.  More specifically, we  regress 
noncapital income on an age spline, the interactions between age and education, gender, and 
family size while controlling for household fixed effects and then compute a measure of 
household permanent income by deriving predicted expected incomes at different ages for 
                                                 
30 We are grateful to Rob Alessie for providing the code to calculate the permanent household income.   
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each household.
31 We use this measure (instead of current household income) to re-estimate 
the regression models presented in Section 4, but our results remain unaffected. 
 
6.  Investigating the Nature of the Peer Income Effects 
  It is plausible to suppose that the effects of perceived social circle income on loan 
behavior depend on whether the individual’s own income is above or below that perceived 
level. In other words, we would expect that people who perceive themselves as poorer than 
their peers tend to be more responsive to changes in peer income than those who feel richer. 
We allow for such asymmetry by replacing peer income in our baseline models (Tables 2, 3, 
and 4) with two terms denoting positive and negative differences between respondent and 
peer income. The results are given in Table 6. For respondents who are poorer than they 
perceive their acquaintances to be, an assumed increase in their social circle’s annual income 
of 12,000 euro (which raises the income gap relative to their peers), increases the probability 
of obtaining a collateralized loan by 3.5 pp and a consumer loan by 1 pp. In fact, it is only the 
effects  for  those  who  perceive  themselves  as  poorer  than  their  social  circle  that  are 
statistically significant, whether with respect to participation or to conditional amounts.
32  
Our results therefore suggest that acquaintances’ income and how it compares to the 
household’s own income tend to influence borrowing, not only from friends and family but 
also from the financial sector. This increased tendency to obtain consumer loans and make 
them  larger  conditional  on  their  provision  is  presumably  aimed  at  boosting  consumer 
spending. The corresponding tendency for collateralized loans, in contrast, stems from efforts 
to acquire collateral assets of higher value. We thus look for evidence that at least part of the 
                                                 
31 As in Kapteyn et al. (2005), we assume a constant interest rate of 3% and a life expectancy of 80 years (which 
roughly corresponds to the average life expectancy in the Netherlands between 2000 and 2010). 
32 The only exception is the likelihood of future borrowing from the social circle, suggesting that households 
consider such a possibility even when their own income exceeds that of their peers and more so when their peers 
become richer, which leads to narrowing of the income gap.   
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peer income effect comes from a comparison with peers’ ability to spend, either on consumer 
goods or on collateral assets. 
  To do so, we use responses to a direct survey question on whether respondents see 
their acquaintances as having “more money to spend” than they do, coded on a seven-point 
ordinal  scale  from  “strongly  disagree”  to  “strongly  agree”.  This  reference  to  “money  to 
spend”  invites  respondents  to  consider  not  only  income  but  also  the  basic  inelastic 
expenditure needs of their acquaintances (e.g., household size). For our part, this focus on 
others’ spending ability allows assessment of whether the intensity of such a perception has 
an independent influence on borrowing behavior. We thus add an ordinal variable denoting 
agreement  that  “acquaintances  have  more  money  to  spend  than  I”  to  our  baseline 
specification for (uncollateralized) consumer loans. As is clear from Table 7 (panel B), in all 
cases, the marginal effects are positive and statistically significant, both for participation and 
for conditional amounts.   
  In the case of collateral assets, such as primary residence, acquaintances’ ability to 
spend is indicated by the size and other observable attributes of the house owned. Our data 
set  includes  objective  information  on  respondents’  homes,  including  the  size  (in  square 
meters) of the living room in the main residence. Not only is this size readily observable to 
most of the social circle, it is likely to reflect the household’s standard of living and priorities 
in  enjoying  life.  Our  data,  however,  provide  no  direct  information  on  the  respondents’ 
perceptions of the social circle’s living arrangements. Therefore, for each respondent’s social 
circle, we compute an average of living room square meters by age/education cells. We also 
take into account the square meters of the respondent’s living room to be sure of estimating 
effects that are net of the respondent’s own living standards. As Table 7 (panel B) shows, 
once the size of the respondent’s own living room is controlled for, the constructed variable 
on the social circle’s average living room size is positive and statistically significant at 5%,  
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both  in  the participation (probit) regression and in  the conditional size of collateral  loan 
(tobit) regression.  
Overall, these results using proxies for direct comparison with the spending or living 
standards  of  peers  support  the  hypothesis  that  such  comparison  partially  influences  the 
tendency of households to have collateralized and uncollateralized loans outstanding, without 
making perceived peers’ income insignificant.  
Probing further into the nature of the comparison effect of average peer income, we 
also examine whether part of the effect is linked to a “tunnel effect”; that is, likely to arise 
because higher peer income signals the potential for one’s own higher income in the future. 
To this end, we consider two alternative measures. First, we take into account respondents’ 
reported expectations about minimum possible income in the next year. Second, we control 
for a measure of permanent income that represents discounted lifetime resources (see Table 
7).
33 Both measures imply a positive and statistically significant effect in the specifications 
modeling collateralized debt, thereby supporting the presence of a  “tunnel effect” for this 
type of loan. Nonetheless, the fact that including additional controls results in somewhat 
smaller but still significant marginal effects of  perceived average peer income on formal 
borrowing  suggests  that  the  “tunnel  effect”  does  not  fully  explain  the  influence  of  peer 
income.  The  remaining  effects  may  well  reflect  alternative  considerations,  like  envy  or 
concern about status, that are not fully captured by the comparison effect proxies included in 
our regressions. 
  Finally, to examine the extent to which the perceived income of peers is associated 
with measures of overindebtedness, we regress loan-to-value ratios, as well as debt-service 
ratios, on the perceived average income of peers and on the rich array of socioeconomic 
covariates used in our baseline specifications. The average marginal effects from the tobit 
                                                 
33 The construction of the measure of permanent income is discussed in Section 5. Estimated marginal effects on 
permanent income refer to changes net of current household income, which enters as an independent control in 
the specification.   
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regressions, outlined in Table 8, imply that an assumed 12,000 euro increase in the perceived 
annual income of the peers contributes 1.2 pp to an average loan-to-value ratio of 18% and 
0.3 pp to an average debt-service ratio of 6%.
34 The endogeneity tests (bottom of the table) 
show no evidence of endogenous peer income in either equation   (p-values  >  .5).  These 
findings suggest that the social interaction effect uncovered is not confined to an individual’s 
own borrowing behavior but is also likely to have implications for financial distress. For 
instance, in the country and time period considered, there was an upward trend in housing 
prices and relatively stable labor market conditions. Nonetheless, factors like the perceived 
income of peers, which induce additional borrowing during times of expansion, could well 
become key determinants of distress during recessions. Indeed, if such reversals are present, 
it may well be worthwhile to extend the logic of “Minsky moments” to household borrowing. 
     
7.  Concluding Remarks 
As discussed in the introduction, although social influences can have quite distinct 
implications for consumption versus borrowing, extant research tends to focus on identifying 
the social effects for the former. In this paper, in contrast, we use unique information from 
the DNB’s household survey, which is representative of the entire Dutch population, to assess 
the effects of social interactions on the tendency to take on different types of debt and the size 
of loans conditional on obtaining them. Most particularly, we exploit respondents’ directly 
elicited perceptions of the average income in their social circle and the ability of their peers to 
spend, thereby circumventing the need to construct a hypothesized social circle based on 
arbitrary assumptions about its members’ characteristics. 
We find that the higher the perceived income of the social circle, the greater the 
tendency of respondents to have outstanding loans and in sizeable amounts. This finding 
                                                 
34 Calculations are a based on a median peer income of 33,000 euro.  
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holds true for both collateralized loans and uncollateralized consumer loans once such factors 
as household resources, reception of financial advice from the social circle, and belief in 
future borrowing from its members are controlled for. The effect is stronger for those who see 
themselves as having lower income than their social circle.  
We also find that, once the perceived average income of the social circle is controlled 
for, the tendency of households to take out uncollateralized and collateralized loans is partly 
related  to  the  perceived  spending  ability  or  (computed)  housing  assets  of  social  circle 
members. Moreover, a household’s expectations about the next period’s (minimum) income 
are statistically significant for collateralized loans—suggesting a “tunnel effect”—but do not 
render peers’ perceived income insignificant. This finding is consistent with the assumption 
that  borrowing  behavior  is  influenced  by  peer  income  not  only  because  it  conveys 
information about the respondent’s own future but also because of a comparison or envy 
effect. Nor is the role of comparison confined to the tendency to borrow and the outstanding 
borrowing amount: it also seemingly extends to financial distress.  
Overall, our study reveals a clear potential for social influences on borrowing. Most 
particularly, after observing that others have higher average incomes, a household not only 
tries (as earlier studies show) to emulate their spending but also decides to borrow more—and 
only partly because of expectations of higher future income. Such decisions are likely to be 
encouraged by a massive and unprecedented housing boom associated with high collateral 
values  and  expectations  of  continuing  house  price  trends.  Hence,  our  finding  that  social 
comparison matters for debt behavior once fundamental household characteristics and region-
time trends are controlled for suggests that there is a need to decouple perceptions of relative 
standing from any decisions to borrow without proper accounting of the associated risks. This 
provides additional motivation and focus for efforts to promote debt literacy and unbiased 
financial advice.   
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Appendix A. Definitions of Variables and Summary Statistics 
 
Types of Debt: 
 
Ability to borrow from social circle. Yes to “Are you currently in a position to borrow a 
substantial sum of money from family or friends?” (LENEN=1) 
 
Loans from social circle: Loans from family and friends. 
 
Collateralized  loans:  Debts  on  hire-purchase  contracts;  debts  based  on  payment  by 
installment; equity based loans; debts with mail-order firms; shops or other retail business; 
mortgages on main house, second house and other pieces of real estate. 
 
Outstanding uncollateralized debt: Private loans; extended lines of credit (unrelated to home 
equity); study loans; credit card debts; other loans. 
 
Questions on characteristics of the social circle: 
 
The following questions concern your circle of acquaintances, that is, the people with whom 
you associate frequently, such as friends, neighbors, acquaintances, or maybe people at work. 
 
KENLTD. If you think of your circle of acquaintances, into which age category do MOST of 
these people go? Please select the answer that is closest to reality. Age (in years) is mostly: 
under 16; 16 – 20; 21 - 25; 26 - 30; 31 - 35; 36 - 40; 41 - 45; 46 - 50; 51 - 55; 56 - 60; 61 - 65; 
66 - 70; 71 or over. 
 
KENHH. The people in your circle of acquaintances may live alone or share a household 
with other people (for example with a partner and children). Of how many persons do MOST 
households  of  your  acquaintances  consist?  one  person;  two  persons;  three  persons;  four 
persons; five persons; six persons or more. 
 
KENINK. How much do you think is the AVERAGE total net income per year of those 
households? less than € 8,000 per year; € 8,000 – 9,500; € 9,500 – 11,000; € 11,000 – 13,000; 
€ 13,000 – 16,000; € 16,000 – 20,000; € 20,000 – 28,000; € 28,000 – 38,000; € 38,000 – 
50,000; € 50,000 – 75,000; € 75,000 or more; don’t know.  
 
KENOPL.  Which  level  of  education  do  MOST  of  your  acquaintances  have?  primary 
education; junior vocational training; lower secondary education; secondary education/pre-
university  education;  senior  vocational  training;  vocational  colleges/first  year  university 
education; university education. 
 
KENWERK.  What  kind  of  employment  do  MOST  of  your  acquaintances  have?  self-
employed;  practicing  a  free  profession;  working  in  the  family  business;  employed  on  a 
contractual basis; mostly no paid job. 
  
MANUUR (VROUWUUR). If you think of the MEN (WOMEN) among your acquaintances, 
how many hours per week do they work on average? 
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Other questions: 
 
Get financial advice from friends. When answering “parents, friends or acquaintances” to the 
following question: “What is your most important source of advice when you have to make 
important financial decisions for the household?” (ADVIES=1). 
 
Social circle has more money to spend than I. “Other people in my environment have more 
money to spend than I. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree” (SITUAT3: 
1.totally disagree…7.totally agree). 
 
Last year income: unusually low. “Is the income your household earned in the past 12 months 
unusually high or low compared to the income you would expect in a ‘regular’ year, or is it 
regular?” (INKNORM= 1.“Unusually low”). 
 
Perceived lower bound on next period’s income. “What do you expect to be the LOWEST 
total net monthly income your household may realize in the next 12 months? (HOOG). 
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Table A1. Summary statistics: various demographics 
 
 Note: Weighted statistics from waves 2001-2008 of DNBHS data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Average Std. Dev.
Number of 
Observations
Age 48.23 15.41 14,893
Male 0.53 0.50 14,892
Couple 0.64 0.48 14,893
Number of Children 0.64 1.03 14,893
Education dummies:
Less than high school 0.27 0.44 14,815
High School 0.34 0.48 14,815
College Degree 0.38 0.48 14,815
Other Education 0.01 0.11 14,815
Labour market status dummies:
Unemployed 0.02 0.14 14,889
Employed 0.54 0.50 14,889
Self employed 0.04 0.20 14,889
Retired 0.17 0.37 14,889
Other status 0.23 0.42 14,889
Last year income: unusually low 0.07 0.25 11,342
Health poor/ fair 0.28 0.45 11,791
Ability to borrow from soc. circle 0.28 0.45 8,782
Get financial advice from friends 0.34 0.47 11,454
Soc. circle has more money to spend than I 3.85 1.47 8,939
Own living room sq. meters 35.98 25.26 12,013
Avg living room sq. meters of friends 36.54 3.37 14,892
Loan-to-value ratio 0.18 0.30 13,081
Debt servicing ratio 0.06 0.15 10,215 
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Table A2. Summary statistics: various economic indicators 
 
Note: Weighted statistics from waves 2001-2008 of DNBHS data. Amounts refer to constant 2008 euro. 
Variable Average Std. Dev. 25th perc Median  75th perc
Number of 
obs
Avg. peer income 31,807 13,955 24,000 33,000 36,941 6,872
Net hh income 27,617 23,638 15,943 24,687 35,886 10,031
Net financial wealth 36,137 100,092 1,393 10,847 36,430 11,412
Net real wealth 102,417 179,408 0 11,913 163,576 13,245
Perceived lower bound on 
next period's income
17,500 36,683 2,134 14,434 26,387 11,049 
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Appendix B. Calculation of average marginal effects via Monte Carlo simulation 
 
Given that marginal effects are non-linear functions of the estimated parameters,  ˆ   (either 
from probit or tobit models), we compute their point estimates and standard errors via Monte 
Carlo simulation (Train, 2003) by using the formula: 
 
    d f g g E ) ( ) ( )) ( (    
 
where  () g   denotes the magnitude  of  interest  and  () f  the joint  distribution  of all  the 
elements in . We implement this simulation estimator by drawing 500 times from the joint 
distribution  of  the  estimated  vector  of  parameters  ˆ    under  the  assumption  that  it  is 
asymptotically  normal  with  mean  and  variance-covariance  matrix  equal  to  the  maximum 
likelihood  estimates.  Then,  for  a  given  parameter  draw j  we  generate  the  magnitude  of 
interest  ˆ ()
j g  . We first calculate this magnitude for each household in our sample, and then 
calculate  the  average  marginal  effect  as  the  weighted  average  of  the  effect  across  all 
households in our sample, using survey weights.
35 We then estimate  ( ( )) Eg and its standard 
error as the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the distribution of  ˆ ()
j g  over all 
parameter  draws.  Details  on  the  formulae  used  to  derive  unconditional  and  conditional 
marginal effects after the tobit estimation can be found in Green (2000, Chapter 22). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 We do not evaluate marginal effects at sample means since this practice can lead to severely misleading 
results (see Train, 2003, pp. 33-34).  
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Appendix C. Further Robustness Checks 
 
We performed a number of checks in addition to those presented in the main text in order to 
ensure the robustness of our findings. First, about 20% of households answer “don’t know” to 
the question regarding the perceived average income of their peers and thus they are not used 
in our baseline regressions. To examine the sensitivity of our findings to the inclusion of 
these missing observations we have re-estimated all our baseline models presented in Tables 
2, 3, and 4 and add a flag dummy to denote households answering that they do not know the 
income of their peers.  For these observations, missing incomes of the peers are replaced by 
zeros. Estimated average marginal effects and associated standard errors for the income of the 
peers  from  this  larger  sample  of  households  are  presented  in  Table  C.1.  Notably,  the 
estimated magnitudes across all specifications are very similar to those we estimate in our 
baseline models.  
 
Second, we experimented with different specifications that employ quartiles to model the 
income of the peers and our results are robust to such transformations. Our results are also 
insensitive to functional forms that use quartiles to model own income and/ or own financial 
and real wealth.  
 
Third, our modeling strategy of borrowing behavior is quite standard in the household finance 
literature  and  in  line  with  life-cycle  portfolio  models  in  which  households  decide  every 
period on the allocation of their resources and the amount of borrowing. Yet, one may argue 
that for many households with collateralized loans outstanding in a given period, the decision 
to take up such loans (especially mortgages) was made many years prior to the interview. To 
examine the sensitivity of our results to this issue, we have re-estimated our probit model for 
collateralized  loans  focusing  only  on  households  that  take  up  such  loans  (i.e.,  switch 
borrowing status) during the period covered by our data. Specifically, we use the sample of 
households without collateralized loans in 2001 (i.e., the initial observation period in our 
sample) and estimate the probability of taking up such a loan in any of the subsequent seven 
waves. This probit model conditions on the same set of covariates as the one used in our 
baseline specification (presented in Table 3). The estimated marginal effect on the income of 
the  peers  is  2  pp,  significant  at  1%,  and  contributes  almost  20%  to  the  unconditional 
probability of taking up a collateralized loan in this sample. Thus, estimated effects on the  
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income of the peers  from this ‘inflow’ sample  are economically important and relatively 
stronger than those in our baseline specification. 
 
Fourth, one might argue that the estimated effects of income of the peers on collateralized 
loans are partly due to expectations about future housing market conditions. To investigate 
this issue, we estimated specifications of collateralized debt behavior that take into account, 
apart  from  peers’  income  and  expectations  about  next  year’s  own  income,  various 
expectations regarding future conditions in housing and mortgage markets.  These include 
whether respondents expect housing prices to go up, whether they anticipate an increase in 
mortgage interest rates, and whether they think that tax deductibility of mortgage interest 
rates  will  be  limited  in  the  future.  Results  (available  upon  request)  suggest  a  significant 
negative  relationship  between  an  expected  increase  in  mortgage  interest  rates  and 
collateralized debt, but they do not affect our baseline findings regarding the significant role 
of income of peers or of expectations about next year’s own income (shown in Table 7, panel 
A). 
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Table C.1. Effects of Peer Income (taking into account ‘do not know’ responses) 
 
 
 
Note:  Selected  marginal  effects  from  probit  regressions  modeling  the  probability  of  having  a  loan  and 
marginal effects from tobit regressions on the log amount of the loan outstanding conditional on having such 
loan. Reported marginal effects are based on a 12,000 euro annual increase of peer income. Specifications in 
panels A, B, and C condition on the same set of covariates used in the baseline specifications in Tables 2, 3, 
and 4, respectively, and a flag dummy denoting households that answer ‘do not know’ to the peer income 
question. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the household level. ***,**,* 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Marg. Eff.std. error Marg. Eff.std. error Marg. Eff.std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0256 0.0081 *** 0.0085 0.0039 ** 0.2735 0.1110 **
Log likelihood -3,372.8 -1,016.7 -1,860.1
Number of Observations 6,375 7,213 7,405
Marg. Eff.std. error Marg. Eff.std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0402 0.0085 *** 0.4589 0.0890 ***
Log likelihood -3,759.7 -14,445.7
Number of Observations 6,373 6,373
Marg. Eff.std. error Marg. Eff.std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0155 0.0055 *** 0.2274 0.0812 ***
Log likelihood -2,374.4 -7,647.0
Number of Observations 6,373 6,373
Pr(Consumer Loans>0) E(log(Cons. Loans))|Cons. 
Loans>0
Panel A. Loans from Social Circle
Pr(perceived ability to 
borrow from social circle in 
Pr(Loans from social 
circle>0)
E(log(Loans from soc. 
circ.))|Loans from soc. circ.>0
Panel B. Collateralized Loans
Pr(Collateralized Loans>0) E(log(Colat. Loans))|Colat. 
Loans>0
Panel C. Consumer Loans 
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Table C.2. Collateralized Loans (controlling for various province-specific housing indicators) 
 
 
Note: Housing indicators are drawn from the Construction & Housing theme tables section of the Statline database of Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau 
voor de Statistiek, http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb). House prices have 2005 as base year.
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0414 0.0090 *** 0.0429 0.0082 *** 0.0428 0.0089 *** 0.0428 0.0083 ***
Socio-economic controls
Province dummies
Year dummies
Quadratic time trend x province dummies
Housing prices by province (yearly growth rate) 0.0093 0.0110
Stock of houses by province (yearly growth rate) 0.0062 0.0569
Home ownership rates by province (yearly growth rate) 0.0001 0.0020
Log likelihood -2,672.2 -2,681.7 -2,682.0 -2,682.0
Number of Observations 4,523 4,523 4,523 4,523
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.4692 0.0895 *** 0.4808 0.0845 *** 0.4799 0.0886 *** 0.4798 0.0843 ***
Socio-economic controls
Province dummies
Year dummies
Quadratic time trend x province dummies
Housing prices by province (yearly growth rate) 0.0984 0.1219
Stock of houses by province (yearly growth rate) 0.1558 0.6087
Home ownership rates by province (yearly growth rate) -0.0021 0.0215
Log likelihood -10,401.5 -10,409.9 -10,410.2 -10,410.2
Number of Observations 4,523 4,523 4,523 4,523
- - -
-
yes yes
yes yes
-
-
-
-
yes yes
no no
yes
yes
no
-
(1) (2)
yes
yes
no
yes
Panel A. Probit: Prob(Collateralized Loans)>0
(3) (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
yes
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
no yes yes yes
yes no no no
- - -
Panel B. Tobit: E(log(Colat. Loans))|Colat. Loans>0
- - -
- - - 
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Table D.1: Auxiliary Regressions 
Age 0.0212 0.0041 *** 0.0212 0.0039 *** 0.0218 0.0041 ***
Age^2 -0.0002 0.0000 *** -0.0002 0.0000 *** -0.0002 0.0000 ***
Male -0.0150 0.0195 -0.0246 0.0184 -0.0166 0.0194
Couple 0.1808 0.0198 *** 0.1812 0.0191 *** 0.1794 0.0197 ***
Numb of Children 0.0112 0.0082 0.0137 0.0079 * 0.0115 0.0083
High School Education 0.2401 0.0245 *** 0.2433 0.0234 *** 0.2375 0.0246 ***
College Degree 0.4194 0.0303 *** 0.4217 0.0288 *** 0.4155 0.0305 ***
Employed 0.1145 0.0261 *** 0.1268 0.0247 *** 0.1148 0.0262 ***
Self employed 0.1096 0.0575 * 0.1099 0.0541 ** 0.1081 0.0575 *
Retired 0.0636 0.0310 ** 0.0684 0.0286 ** 0.0651 0.0312 **
Unemployed 0.1202 0.0602 ** 0.1128 0.0590 * 0.1231 0.0605 **
Last year income: unusually low -0.1270 0.0336 *** -0.1220 0.0318 *** -0.1246 0.0335 ***
Health poor/ fair -0.0294 0.0171 * -0.0227 0.0161 -0.0280 0.0171
IHS(net hh income)  0.0144 0.0029 *** 0.0124 0.0026 *** 0.0142 0.0029 ***
IHS(net fin wealth) 0.0030 0.0011 *** 0.0027 0.0011 ** 0.0028 0.0011 **
IHS(net real wealth) 0.0069 0.0017 *** 0.0073 0.0016 *** 0.0068 0.0017 ***
Percv. ability to borrow from social 
circle in the future
0.0292 0.0160 *
Get advice from soc. circle -0.0040 0.0154
avg. peer Education 0.0182 0.0182 0.0195 0.0171 0.0176 0.0182
Province dummies
Year dummies
Province x Year dummies
Constant 9.5153 0.1229 *** 9.5488 0.1156 *** 9.4976 0.1253 ***
(avg. peer Educat. - own 
Educat.)*Regional empl. % in high tech 0.0364 0.0031 *** 0.0374 0.0029 *** 0.0362 0.0031 ***
F-statistic - instruments (p-value) 140.42 0.00 *** 169.49 0.00 *** 138.99 0.00 ***
Number of Observations 4,363 4,899 4,362
(1) (2) (3)
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
-
-
yes
yes
yes yes
-
- 
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Table 1. Prevalence and Amount of Borrowing by Loan type 
 
 
Note: Weighted statistics from waves 2001-2008 of DNBHS data. Amounts refer to 
constant 2008 euro. 
 
 
 
Year Average 25th perc Median 75th perc
2001 30.45% 4.87% 15,212 1,583 2,771 15,832
2002 32.24% 4.96% 13,582 2,279 5,065 12,662
2003 29.68% 4.26% 12,010 1,391 3,241 15,689
2004 25.80% 3.92% 10,207 1,058 3,704 10,783
2005 28.12% 4.47% 7,976 1,098 2,196 7,320
2006 27.55% 3.73% 7,650 1,439 3,085 7,197
2007 25.99% 3.72% 8,488 1,829 3,810 7,112
2008 28.10% 3.49% 9,422 1,500 3,000 7,900
Total 28.31% 4.16% 10,638 1,519 3,313 10,282
Average 25th perc Median 75th perc
2001 37.81% 105,038 44,857 83,118 131,934
2002 43.22% 113,177 45,760 89,288 139,512
2003 43.12% 113,921 44,298 90,757 146,940
2004 40.96% 110,673 46,562 92,065 145,405
2005 41.25% 118,971 51,238 100,384 156,851
2006 40.69% 117,246 49,353 100,763 159,370
2007 41.02% 132,048 59,944 111,760 181,864
2008 40.92% 132,920 61,750 120,000 180,000
Total 41.15% 117,926 48,620 98,293 156,664
Average 25th perc Median 75th perc
2001 22.24% 11,451 956 4,486 11,610
2002 24.62% 9,448 843 4,659 12,344
2003 25.86% 13,030 918 4,415 13,487
2004 25.09% 11,315 835 4,021 11,794
2005 19.13% 14,957 1,045 4,273 12,548
2006 18.64% 11,267 853 4,138 12,287
2007 20.57% 11,196 889 3,835 11,379
2008 20.33% 12,008 680 3,750 11,206
Total 22.09% 11,793 875 4,181 12,155
Panel A. Loans from Social Circle
Panel C. Consumer Loans
Panel B. Collateralized Loans
Conditional amounts outstanding
Conditional amounts outstanding Prevalence 
(%)
Prevalence 
(%)
Perceived ability 
to borrow from 
social circle in 
the future (%)
Prevalence 
(%)
Conditional amounts outstanding 
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Table 2. Loans from Social Circle 
 
 
 
Note: Marginal effects from probit regressions modeling the probability of having an outstanding loan from friends 
and marginal effects from tobit regressions on the log amount of loan outstanding conditional on having such loan. All 
marginal effects have been averaged across households in the sample using survey weights.  The marginal effects for 
peer income are based on a 12,000 euro annual increase of the underlying variable. The marginal effects for household 
income,  financial,  and  real  wealth  are  calculated  assuming  a  one  standard  deviation  increase  of  the  underlying 
covariates. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the household level. ***,**,* denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0217 0.0076 *** 0.0079 0.0042 * 0.2541 0.1270 **
Age -0.0086 0.0010 *** -0.0016 0.0005 *** -0.0524 0.0170 ***
Male 0.0477 0.0216 ** 0.0047 0.0087 0.1585 0.2699
Couple 0.0332 0.0221 -0.0097 0.0112 -0.2908 0.3355
Numb of Children -0.0040 0.0110 -0.0018 0.0056 -0.0667 0.1480
High School Education 0.0706 0.0259 *** 0.0285 0.0130 ** 0.8595 0.3478 **
College Degree 0.0776 0.0267 *** 0.0085 0.0116 0.2969 0.3586
Other Education 0.2444 0.1153 ** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Employed -0.0014 0.0291 0.0149 0.0120 0.4489 0.3276
Self employed 0.0445 0.0553 0.0493 0.0327 1.3611 0.6905 **
Retired -0.0562 0.0339 * -0.0020 0.0158 -0.0817 0.4823
Unemployed -0.1146 0.0518 ** -0.0057 0.0210 -0.2748 0.6369
Last year income: unusually low -0.0852 0.0307 *** 0.0346 0.0200 * 0.9122 0.4351 **
Health poor/ fair -0.0531 0.0195 *** -0.0030 0.0096 -0.1130 0.2955
IHS(net hh income)  0.0010 0.0042 0.0006 0.0019 0.0170 0.0571
IHS(net fin wealth) 0.0225 0.0063 *** -0.0147 0.0033 *** -0.6809 0.1243 ***
IHS(net real wealth) 0.0034 0.0070 0.0061 0.0038 0.1862 0.1140
Province dummies
Year dummies
Province x Year dummies
Log likelihood -2,493.3 -786.3 -1,468.3
Number of Observations 4,524 4,899 5,074
F-statistic from Auxilliary Regression (p-value) 140.42 0.00 *** 169.49 0.00 *** 169.49 0.00 ***
Exogeneity Test (p-value) 2.23 0.14 0.08 0.78 0.09 0.76
Number of Observations 4,363 4,899 4,899
Probit Tobit
IV tests
Pr(perceived ability to 
borrow from social circle in 
the future>0)
Pr(Loans from social 
circle>0)
yes yes
yes yes
E(log(Loans from soc. 
circle))|Loans from soc. 
circle>0
yes
yes
yes yes yes 
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Table 3. Collateralized Loans 
 
 
 
Note: Marginal effects from probit regressions modeling the probability of having an outstanding collateralized 
loan and marginal effects from tobit regressions on the log amount of collateralized loan outstanding conditional 
on having such loan. See notes in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0417 0.0081 *** 0.4750 0.0842 ***
Age -0.0016 0.0011 -0.0285 0.0127 **
Male 0.0021 0.0242 0.0200 0.2996
Couple 0.1782 0.0275 *** 1.9488 0.2634 ***
Numb of Children 0.0143 0.0118 0.1214 0.1273
High School Education 0.0213 0.0298 0.2275 0.3236
College Degree 0.0685 0.0295 ** 0.8108 0.3411 **
Other Education 0.0325 0.1448 0.5109 1.8565
Employed 0.0806 0.0334 ** 0.8909 0.3696 **
Self employed 0.0863 0.0553 1.0572 0.6306 *
Retired 0.0287 0.0386 0.4851 0.4462
Unemployed 0.0171 0.0692 0.1932 0.8432
Last year income: unusually low -0.0983 0.0351 *** -1.3074 0.3927 ***
Health poor/ fair -0.0110 0.0214 -0.2003 0.2362
IHS(net hh income)  0.0142 0.0039 *** 0.1444 0.0389 ***
IHS(net fin wealth) 0.0043 0.0069 0.0690 0.0650
IHS(net real wealth) 0.0725 0.0094 *** 0.4008 0.0551 ***
Perceived ability to borrow from soc. circle in the future 0.0054 0.0196 -0.0299 0.2213
Get advice from soc. circle -0.0304 0.0206 -0.4084 0.2144 *
Province dummies
Year dummies
Province x Year dummies
Log likelihood -2,651.1 -10,381.9
Number of Observations 4,523 4,523
F-statistic from Auxilliary Regression (p-value) 138.99 0.00 *** 138.99 0.00 ***
Exogeneity Test (p-value) 1.72 0.19 1.37 0.24
Number of Observations 4,362 4,362
Pr(Collateralized Loans>0)
E(log(Colat. Loans))|Colat. 
Loans>0
Probit Tobit
IV tests
yes yes
yes yes
yes yes 
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Table 4. Consumer Loans 
 
 
 
Note: Marginal effects from probit regressions modeling the probability of having a consumer loan and marginal 
effects from tobit regressions on the log amount of consumer loan outstanding conditional on having such loan. 
See notes in Table 2. 
 
 
 
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0157 0.0055 *** 0.2422 0.0796 ***
Age -0.0020 0.0007 *** -0.0273 0.0088 ***
Male 0.0090 0.0139 0.2316 0.2033
Couple 0.0549 0.0154 *** 0.6820 0.2216 ***
Numb of Children 0.0013 0.0073 0.0352 0.0989
High School Education 0.0220 0.0184 0.2427 0.2661
College Degree 0.0169 0.0180 0.1149 0.2662
Other Education 0.1151 0.0923 0.9607 1.0431
Employed 0.0190 0.0208 0.1022 0.2515
Self employed 0.0337 0.0335 0.1990 0.4650
Retired 0.0016 0.0259 -0.2109 0.4032
Unemployed 0.0592 0.0529 0.6828 0.6059
Last year income: unusually low 0.0706 0.0294 ** 0.8688 0.3181 ***
Health poor/ fair 0.0221 0.0140 0.2659 0.1884
IHS(net hh income)  0.0037 0.0029 0.0808 0.0485 *
IHS(net fin wealth) -0.1969 0.0041 *** -3.5256 0.0534 ***
IHS(net real wealth) 0.0008 0.0054 -0.0006 0.0933
Perceived ability to borrow from soc. circle in the future -0.0103 0.0125 -0.1614 0.1800
Get advice from soc. circle -0.0260 0.0130 ** -0.3613 0.1786 **
Province dummies
Year dummies
Province x Year dummies
Log likelihood -1,652.3 -5,405.3
Number of Observations 4,513 4,523
F-statistic from Auxilliary Regression (p-value) 135.67 0.00 *** 139.26 0.00 ***
Exogeneity Test (p-value) 0.04 0.85 0.12 0.73
Number of Observations 4,273 4,346
IV tests
yes yes
Probit Tobit
Pr(Consumer Loans>0) E(log(Cons. Loans))|Cons. 
Loans>0
yes yes
yes yes 
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Table 5. Placebo Regressions 
 
Note: Selected marginal effects from probit regressions modeling the probability of having a formal loan and marginal effects from 
tobit regressions on the log amount of the loan outstanding conditional on having such loan. Peer income is that of a randomly 
assigned household belonging to the same year, age, education, gender cell as the respondent’s social circle. The marginal effects for 
peer income are based on a 12,000 euro annual increase of the underlying variable. Specifications in panel A (panel B) condition on 
the same set of covariates used in the baseline specifications in Table 3 (Table 4). Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity 
and clustered at the household level. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0051 0.0063 0.0556 0.0787
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0007 0.0046 0.0055 0.0501
Pr(Consumer Loans>0)
E(log(Cons. Loans))|Cons. 
Loans>0
Panel A. Collateralized Loans
Panel B. Consumer Loans
Pr(Collateralized Loans>0)
E(log(Colat. Loans))|Colat. 
Loans>0 
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Table 6. Asymmetric Effects of Peer Income 
 
 
Note: Selected marginal effects from probit regressions modeling the probability of having a loan and marginal effects from tobit regressions on the log 
amount of the loan outstanding conditional on having such loan. Presented marginal effects are based on a 12,000 euro annual increase of peer income. 
Specifications in panels A, B, and C condition on the same set of covariates used in the baseline specifications in Tables 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Standard 
errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the household level. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff.std. error
IHS(own income)-IHS(avg. peer income)>0 0.0117 0.0051 ** 0.0006 0.0024 0.0133 0.0700
IHS(own income)-IHS(avg. peer income)<0 0.0104 0.0042 ** 0.0060 0.0025 ** 0.2009 0.0746 ***
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff.std. error
IHS(own income)-IHS(avg. peer income)>0 -0.0059 0.0060 -0.0261 0.0657
IHS(own income)-IHS(avg. peer income)<0 0.0354 0.0051 *** 0.3116 0.0424 ***
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff.std. error
IHS(own income)-IHS(avg. peer income)>0 0.0034 0.0037 0.0483 0.0498
IHS(own income)-IHS(avg. peer income)<0 0.0104 0.0031 *** 0.1696 0.0490 ***
Panel A. Loans from Social Circle
Panel B. Collateralized Loans
Panel C. Consumer Loans
Pr(Collateralized Loans>0)
E(log(Colat. Loans))|Colat. 
Loans>0
Pr(Consumer Loans>0)
Pr(perceived ability to 
borrow from social circle in 
the future>0)
Pr(Loans from social circle>0)
E(log(Loans from social 
circle))|Loans from social 
circle>0
E(log(Cons. Loans))|Cons. 
Loans>0 
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Table 7.  Living Standards, Perceived Ability of the Social Circle to Spend, and Future Own Income 
 
Note: Selected marginal effects from probit regressions modeling the probability of having a formal loan and marginal effects from tobit 
regressions on the log amount of the loan outstanding conditional on having such loan. The marginal effects for peer income are based on a 
12,000 euro annual increase of the underlying variable. The marginal effects for average sq. meters of friends, own square meters, expected 
lower bound on next period’s income, and estimated permanent income are calculated assuming a one SD increase of the underlying covariates. 
Specifications in panel A (panel B) also condition on the set of covariates used in the baseline specifications in Table 3 (Table 4). Standard 
errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the household level. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0328 0.0086 *** 0.0225 0.0092 ** 0.3920 0.0887 *** 0.2877 0.0944 ***
Avg sq. meters of friends 0.0207 0.0105 ** 0.0279 0.0108 *** 0.2764 0.1245 ** 0.3691 0.1314 ***
Own sq. meters 0.0421 0.0163 *** 0.0324 0.0149 ** 0.3750 0.1372 *** 0.2926 0.1226 **
IHS(perceived lower bound on next period’s income) 0.0434 0.0124 *** - - 0.4707 0.1334 *** - -
IHS(estimated permanent income) - - 0.0384 0.0185 ** - - 0.6096 0.2982 **
Log likelihood -2,407.9 -2,228.3 -9,851.7 -9,182.5
Number of Observations 4,204 3,964 4,206 3,964
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0128 0.0058 ** 0.0127 0.0064 ** 0.1920 0.0859 ** 0.1956 0.0833 **
Soc. circle has more money to spend than I 0.0125 0.0048 *** 0.0135 0.0049 *** 0.1873 0.0618 *** 0.1958 0.0675 ***
IHS(perceived lower bound on next period’s income) -0.0007 0.0086 - - 0.0218 0.1308 - -
IHS(estimated permanent income) - - 0.0086 0.0210 - - 0.0926 0.2417
Log likelihood -1,329.8 -1,248.2 -4,413.0 -4,128.5
Number of Observations 3,662 3,440 3,669 3,457
Prob(Consumer Loans>0) E(log(Cons. Loans))|Cons. Loans>0
Probit Tobit
Panel B. Consumer Loans
Prob(Collateralized Loans>0) E(log(Colat. Loans))|Colat. Loans>0
Tobit Probit
Panel A. Collateralized Loans 
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Table 8. Peer Income and Over-indebtedness 
 
 
 
Note: Marginal effects from tobit regressions on measures of financial distress. All marginal effects 
have been averaged across households in the sample using survey weights.  The marginal effects for 
peer income are based on a 12,000 euro annual increase of the underlying variable. The marginal 
effects  for  household  income,  financial,  and  real  wealth  are  calculated  assuming  a  one  standard 
deviation increase of the underlying covariates. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and 
clustered at the household level. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0353 0.0058 *** 0.0093 0.0032 ***
Age -0.0040 0.0007 *** -0.0006 0.0005
Male -0.0047 0.0163 0.0118 0.0105
Couple 0.1149 0.0177 *** 0.0295 0.0113 ***
Numb of Children 0.0101 0.0080 0.0005 0.0046
High School Education 0.0003 0.0191 0.0198 0.0109 *
College Degree 0.0408 0.0192 ** 0.0314 0.0116 ***
Other Education 0.0729 0.1201 0.0505 0.0786
Employed 0.0712 0.0206 *** 0.0346 0.0153 **
Self employed 0.0879 0.0382 ** 0.0200 0.0232
Retired 0.0464 0.0256 * 0.0185 0.0166
Unemployed 0.0176 0.0477 0.0286 0.0308
Last year income: unusually low -0.0943 0.0222 *** -0.0493 0.0123 ***
Health poor/ fair -0.0175 0.0147 -0.0095 0.0084
IHS(net hh income)  0.0107 0.0030 *** 0.0184 0.0017 ***
IHS(net fin wealth) 0.0118 0.0052 ** 0.0017 0.0026
IHS(net real wealth) -0.0031 0.0070 0.0242 0.0041 ***
Perceived ability to borrow from soc. circle in the future -0.0123 0.0131 -0.0045 0.0080
Get advice from soc. circle -0.0318 0.0129 ** -0.0090 0.0083
Province dummies
Year dummies
Province x Year dummies
Log likelihood -3,115.0 -1,759.4
Number of Observations 4,504 3,722
F-statistic from Auxilliary Regression (p-value) 139.05 0.00 *** 126.52 0.00 ***
Exogeneity Test (p-value) 0.43 0.51 0.62 0.43
Number of Observations 4,331 3,453
E(Loan to Value Ratio) E(Debt Servicing Ratio)
Tobit Tobit
IV tests
yes yes
yes yes
yes yes